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ABSTRACT 
In a world of incomplete marker.s for environmental goods, ex ance 
planned expenditures rather than ex post realized outcomes explain t.:..:.e values 
individuals attach to these goods. We use the distance function to develop 
restrictions from a model of ex ante consumer behavior involving these goods. 
A contingent valuation approach is then employed to estimate policy-relevant 
components of the ex ante economic values thar. recreationists attach =o 
differing subjective probabilities of alternative atmospheric visibility 
levels at a wilderness location and at an urban location in Oregon. .'1arginal 
valuations of probability changes are similar at the two sites. Marginal 
rates of time preference for resolving uncertainties vary between 10 and 50 
percent and are inversely related to education. Existence value averages 10 
percent of total value, and evidence is mixed thac site-specific val~es act as 
surrogates for general environmental preferences. 
I. INT."?.O!JUCT ION 
"Landscape perception and the impulse to preservation of 
place is, perhaps, no more or less an authentic existential act, 
free of deterministic rationalism, undertaken as a way to dignify 
a man and to make his surroundings more humane ... In these 
technologically parlous times, the impulse born of aesthetic 
perception and the fruitless search for Eden is, surely, absurd. 
But it is authentically affirmative of life. What further 
argument tor landscape preservation is needed?" 
50) 
(Little, 1975, p. 
.'1. search tor an Eden 1.n whic;h nothing disturbs aesthet.Lc and ::-:ora.I. 
visions of nature may well be absurd. Nevertheless, in the United States, :he 
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (PL95-95, 91 Stat. 731) and ocher environmental 
laws demand a public conscience which strives for something less than Eden a~d 
which insists that the nothing less be rationalized. The Amendments demand 
justifications for landscape preservation or restoration that otter more 
information than can entreaties about existential acts authentically 
affirmative of life. 
If consumer sovereignty commands respect, public environmental cor.~ro1 
authorities must incorporate into policy decisions individuals' preference 
revelations far alternative environmental states. These revelations and the~r 
consumer welfare implications can be measured either ex ante or ex post. .:..ne 
ex ante measure, the option price, is the compensation paid or received co 
restore expecr:.ed utility given a change in the expected environment. Expec:ed 
consumer's surplus, the ex post measure, is r:.he Marshallian or Hicksian 
surplus evaluated after the true state of nature is revealed. Buchanan ( 1969) 
and Helms (1985) demonstrate r:.hat the ex ante measure is the less restrictive 
of the cwo since it captures risk attitudes -- the precise factor of incere5c 
when the exact environmental consequences of a policy choice are uncertain. 
Therefore, in a world of ir.complete markets for environmental goods, ex ante 
planned expenditures rather than ex post realized outcomes explain chcice and 
welfare. 
An ex ante approach is especially appropriate when estimating :he value 
of atmospheric visibility in landscapes. Prospective visibility levels are 
inherently uncertain, implying that individuals and policymakers r77us: a.2locace 
resources based on the perceived probability chat a particular visibi2icy 
state will occur at a particular time and place. Studies about the 'lalue of 
visibility have appeared for at least fifteen years.L The sequence of 
studies perhaps represents the most complete example of the evolution of 
nonmarketed environmental good valuation techniques. Nevertheless, :hey 
examine rather restrictive problem dimensions relative to the choices 
individuals and policymakers actually confront. The stochastic and :he 
intertemporal features of visibility changes have been totally neglec:ed, ancl 
the physical and spatial features of the individual's decision prcb2e~ have 
sometimes not been fully defined. Similar inattentions to important 
dimensions of policy choices are found throughout the nonmarketed qoods 
valuation literature. In this paper, we show that the contingent val~ac~on 
method (CVN) 1.s easily made to fit the dimensions of policy choices, 
dimensions that form nearly every environmental good. In addition, we provide 
empirical insights into the roles that each of these dimensions play in 
individuals' atmospheric visibility valuations. 
We use CVM to construct tour contingent claims markets in which the 
physical, stochastic, spatial, and intertemporal properties of access to 
visibility states are varied. Our study builds upon previous ex ante 
valuation studies (see for example Brookshire et al., 1983, and Desvousges et 
al., 1987) of environmental goods in four key ways. First, Ne elicit the 
2 
individual's subjective probabilities of alternative visibility staces, 
thereby allowing his personal risk perceptions to influence his valuaci~ns of 
differing access contingencies. Previous studies provided each respondent 
with a uniform "objective" probability selected by the researchers and chen 
elicited valuations based on changes in this probability. These ear2_i_er 
approaches did not recognize that different people may have differer.: 
perceptions of the probability of an event. 
Second, we provide the first test of Kahneman's (1986) conjeccure chat 
site-specific values in CVM merely act as surrogate measures for genera~ 
environmental preferences. If Kahneman is correct, then site-specific 
nonmarket valuation studies using CVM will not provide useful infor~aticn for 
the specific amenity in question. 
Third, we estimate marginal rates of time preference for improved 
visibility. Finally, we supply estimates of the existence value of improved 
visibility. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we develop a model 
of ex ante visibility valuation. Section 3 describes a CVM design consistent 
with the ex ante valuation model. Empirical results are presented and 
examined in Section 4. The last section summarizes the paper and discusses 
its broader implications and limitations. 
II. .~ ."10DEL 
Below we use an explicit model of consumer behavior co develop 
restrictions that subsequently guide the inte.:pretation of our empi:::ical 
results. Specifically, we identify the parameters of four key dimensions of 
value relevant to atmospheric visibility and other environmencal policy 
3 
decisions: option price, marginal rates of cime preference, exiscence val~e, 
and location value. 
Definitions and Assumotions. Consider an individual who practices a 
two-stage budget allocation process. In stage one, he allocates his money 
income and leisure time in a weakly separable fashion between recreational 
activities and all other commodities. In stage two, he allocates his 
recreational budget, M, given a fixed, twice-differentiable, and quasi-concave 
von Heumann-Morgenstern subutility function, u. Assume this individual 
expects to derive utility from a vector of site-specific recreation 
activities, x, a site-specific level of atmospheric visibility, Q, and, 
following Smith (1987), a set of contingent claims, Z, defining the nonprice 
terms under which access to a site will be available. Hiking, camping, and 
travel to a site are examples of x-vector elements. The contingent claims are 
defined over the physical, stochastic, spacial, and intertemporal pr=pertles 
of access. Let p represent the vector of exogenous money and time prices for 
x, where the elements of x are measured in terms of annual site-spec~i~c 
participation or visit frequencies. 
Further assume that the individual's total visits to all sites and tha: 
the sequencing and allocation of his total visits among sites are invariant. 
Suppose that there exists a finite, nonzero equilibrium pr~ce at which a fixed 
length specific site visit, ~~ k 
variable. 
1, ... ,n, ;,..·auld be made when ~ is a choice 
Let Q be uncertain. Suppose that~~ i = 1, ... ,n, represents 
alternative visibility states. Because his total site visits and their 
allocation and sequence are invariant, ~ is exogenous co the individual. 
4 
Lee ,-.(A) 
1. 
be his subjective probability of state i occurring ac 
conditional on the ambient air pollution concentrations, A. 
site x. 
' 
Finally, ~k is a freely and fully enforceable access claim or contract 
co a visibility state, Q., at a time j, j = 1, ... , t, 
1. 
the normalized price tor this access claim. 
at a site x. 
' 
::ec oe 
The Distance Function. With the planned expenditure funcc1..on yf Helms 
(1985) and Smith (1987), the individual chooses an expendit.'-lre-minimizing 
quantity of a contingent claim for a visibility state subject to a fixed 
ex ante level of expected utility, V: 
c(f]. ,; 
1.] ,( 
x; p; V· 
' 
7rl(A), • • • I ;; (A); Q 1' . ,Q ) n n 
min ~ ~ <: 
·
3 iJk2ijk + px 
z ijk 1. J K 
subject to V ~~t.U(x,Q;,z ,), 
.1. .1. ..L ..._ .l.]K 
where, given the invariance of visits, c(•j is the restricted c~st c~ u=~~~=~· 
or expenditure funccion for a given level of expected utility. This 
expenditure function is consistent with the dichotomous choice (yes.'~o) 
approach used in some recent CV!1 studies, e.g., Hanemann ( 1984) T.>:.e 
individual is presented with a price, {3 ijk' for a posited contingent claim, 
and is chen asked if he would purchase a particular quanti::y of :he -::la.i...m. 
The expenditure function in (1) is not immediately t.ranslatable, 
however, into the traditional CV/1 elicitation process, e.g., Brookshir-e e: a__... 
(1983), where a quantity of an investigator-supplied contingent clai~ L5 
described to :he respondent and he is then asked to state :he price he wou~d 
pay to secure it. A distance function, which Deaton ( 1979 J shO'-'IS to be :he 
dual of the expenditure function, accurately describes this version of ::-:e 
5 
decision problem. Given that visits are not a choice variable, we f8llow 
Deaton (1979) and Pauwels {1988) and define the restricted distance :unction, 
d ( •) as 
min !: !: I: I3 i].k z i]'k + px 
J3 ijk i j k 
subject to Z Z Z c(I3.;]·k; 
j k ... 
x; p; V; ~.(A); Q.) 
~ ~ 
( 2) 
1 . 
Pauwels (1988) shows that differentiation of the restricted distance function 
with respect to a Zijk yields the restricted compensated inverse deman::i 
function with marginal willingness to pay as a function of utility and the 
Given (2), we now examine the ex ante compensating surplus me=.sures of 
value, the ~k' for four contingent claims defining conditions of ac=ess co 
q: (a) the value (option price) of changing the probability of secu~ing an 
access claim to ~; (b) the value (time preference) when an already secured 
access claim to '\ is delayed until the r;lh time period; (c) the value ::hat 
remains (existence value) after removing an already secured access claim from 
the choice set; and (d) the value added (locational value) when an.already 
secured access claim is extended from one site to a set of k sites. 
Ootion Price. For a specific site and time the individual's restr~cted 
option price, OPi, 0 for a change from "ito "i in the probability of securing 
an access claim to the ith visibility state (level) is 
OP. = d(Z .. k; x; p; 
~ ~] 
- d(Z ijk; x; p,- v,- " 
~ 
i Q.) • 
~ 
OPi is thus the change in planned expenditures on Zijk to be allowed the 
6 
( J) 
individual .. 0 he is to be indifferent between~- and,, ~!hen there 
l l 
states, OP is ti1e average of the changes in planned expenditures thac must. 
be allowed him if he is t..o recover his initial expected utility level.~ If 
the individual's expected utility function is concave in the~~ Jensen's 
inequality implies that OPi will be greater than the income cf}ange ::equi::ed "''""' 
recover the individual's expected utility level after c.he realizaci:=."l of whac 
was the average of the visibility states. The difference represen:s a risk 
premium which incorporates risk attitudes and risk beliefs or percept..ior..s. 
The premium changes as the subjective probability densicy function -.::han.ges 
(Helms, 1985). 
Time Preference. The outcomes of programs to alt.~r environme~:al 
amenities are not instantaneously realized and abandoned, nor are t..he 
alterations necessarily permanent. At a specific site, the individ~al ~·alues 
a delay from t = 1 to t = n, n > 1, in securing an access claim t~ ~ 
particular subjective probability, 
DV. 
l 
0 
7f" i I of the ih visibility level as 
x· 
' 
p; V; 0 Tt . ,. 
l 
0 
" ' Q ) • 
l l 
Estimation of D~ allows the individual's marginal rate of time preferer.-.::e to 
be directly inferred using the appropriate present value and discoun=ing 
formulae. 
Existence Value. Starting with Krutilla (1967), economists ha'le 
repeatedly argued that an individual can value an amenity wichout ever ~sing 
it or planning to use it. Within our framework, this implies :hac =he 
individual would value some particular probability of provision of ~ ac a 
specific site and time even though any claim of access to this C\ is 
7 
completely removed from his choice set. 
XV. 
1. 
- d ( z . , ... , znJ·k; 2]k 
Thus existence value, 
V; 
x; p,- v,-
0 
7i . ,. 
~ 
Q } 
~ 
XV 
i 
l..S 
(5) 
Location Value. Finally, we examine how ex ante valuations of an access 
claim to ~ vary with the spatial coverage of the claim. Thus location value, 
LV. 
1. 
d(Z .
1 
/ X/ p,· V,-
1. T 
0 
71 . ,. 
1. 
- d(Z .. k; 
1.) 
x; 
0 p,- v,- To./ 
1. 
(6) 
where T is the union of locations, k = 1, ... ,m. A small or zero mag~..z..cude f~r 
L~ would be consistent with Kahneman's (1986, pp. 190-193) conjecture that 
site-specific value statements in contingent valuation experiments are real~;· 
surrogates for attitudes about environmental quality, broadly conceLved. 
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION EXPERI/1ENT 
The Design. The CVM questionnaire was built around computer-generated 
haze levels superimposed upon an 8 x 10 inch color photograph of a v~sta from 
a Central Oregon Cascades wilderness site and an 8 x 10 inch color photograph 
of a vista from a Portland, Oregon, urban park site. The Cascades ir:zages 
depicted a hilltop view coward heavily forested lesser hills, while the 
Portland images represented the view of Mount Hood obtained looking east frcm 
the hills lying immediately to the west at the city's downtown area. Visual 
ranges far the Cascades simulations were 309, 121, 88, and 53 kilometers,- the 
Portland simulations portrayed ranges of 82, 43, 30, and 20 kilometers. For 
each sice, these distances corresponded respectively co che 90ch, 50ch, 20th, 
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and 2.5th percentiles of the visual range cumulative distrLbutions (Co:e, 
1985). For concreteness, all interviews were conducted outdoors in late 
summer 1985, in the immediate vicinities of the photograph sites. 
The questionnaire at each site proceeded in three steps. First, the 
respondent was asked to rank-order the four depicted vistas from h~s most to 
his least preferred. Second, he was asked to state che percentage chances 
during his visit (Cascades) or his summertime presence in the :::i:.y (?or:iand) 
that his most and his least preferred vistas would occur. Finally, in. 
accordance with (2) 1 he was asked to estimate his marginal willin.gness -~pay 
for each of a series of contingent claims defin.ing changes in access 
conditions for the four vistas. This three-stage structure allowed the 
respondent first to frame and then to solve his decision problem. Separat~on 
of the ordering and the value estimation processes reduces the comp1exi:y of 
the respondent's task and conforms co the Slavic and Lichtenstein (: 963) '/.l.e•·; 
of decision making in which the framing phase precedes the evaluation phase. 
In the third step, each respondent initially estimated (3), his optlon 
price for an access claim supplied by a special fund that would guarantee 
provision -of each of the appropriate tour vistas during his cur:-ent :;.i.si: 
(Cascades) or during the current summer (Por~land). The respondent ~;as noc 
allowed to adjust visit or activity patterns during this third step.-:. 
Cascades respondents estimated their option prices in terms of a daily sccess 
fee over and above any entrance fee that they had already paid. In ?or:land 
. ~.' 
the respondent was asked to estimate his one-t~me opt~on pr2ce.~ 
The starting bid point for a claim gua:anceeing provision of a Cascades 
respondent's most preferred vista was $3.00, ;.vith intervals varying bet:-,.een 
$0.50 and $4.00 according to the interviewer's perception of the respondent's 
9 
impatience,- the Portland starting point was $40.00, with inte.:-vals spread from 
$1.00 to 520.00.~ This iterative value estimation procedure applied only tc 
the respondent's most preferred vista. Once he had settled upon his max1.mum 
payment for this vista, he presumably had enough information about his 
preferences to allow him to state without further prodding his option prices 
for the three remaining vistas. Finally, the respondent. estimated t.he time 
preference, existence, and location values in (4), (5), and {6) by adjust.:..ng 
his option price statement for his most preferred vista. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data Properties. Data were obtained from 99 Cascades and 67 ?crtland 
interviews ,?J The Cascades sample retains all completed interviewsi =he 
Portland sample excises a single completed interview with a 13-year-old 
female. Both samples had very similar demographic features. 
Cascades respondents were engaged in multiplepurpose trips. The med~an rou::d 
trip mileage for the Cascades sample was substantially less than the 
arithmetic mean. Respondents' visits to the ?oreland site were near2y always 
an interlude in a round of daily activities. 
The expected visual ranges of 134 km in the Cascades and 47 k~ in 
Portland were calculated by weighting the visual ranges in each respondent's 
most and least preferred vistas by the respective subjective probabilities 
that he had assigned, splitting the residual probability equally between :he 
two remaining visual ranges, and then summing over the four probability-
weighted visual ranges. The resulting arithmetic means taken over all 
respondents exceed by 10 percent the actual visual range medians of 121 .<.rn .:n 
the Cascades and 43 km in Portland. However, respondencs' perceived 
10 
probabilities of their most and their least preferred vistas exceeded the true 
probabili~ies by a factor of two or more, thus supporting findings cf 
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) and l1achina (1982) that people tend to over-assess 
low probab~lity .events. 
Preference Exvressions. No outright preference reversals occ~rred 
between any respondent's initial rank-ordering of vistas and his marginal 
value estimates, although equal estimates were frequently provided for vistas 
which the respondent had earlier strongly rank-ordered. Every responden ~ 's 
rank-orderings and technical rank-orderings of vistas with the two greatest 
visual ranges were identical at each site. Tables la and lb presen~ 
statistics for respondent estimates of the option price, 0~. Giver. 
independence of respondent subjective probability estimates and val~e 
estimates of vistas, the tables report the average respondent's marq~nal 
willingness to pay for a claim securing a change from the probability he had 
earlier assigned the occurrence of each vista to the guaranteed provision of 
the vista. For example, the $4.04 figure in the 309 km column of Table la 
says that: the average respondent was willing to pay this amount: in order co 
secure a claim that would increase the chance of this vista being ~ealized 
from 35 percent to 100 percent, where 35 percent is che arithmetic r:1ean of 
Cascades respondents' perceived chance of their most preferred vista. This 
respondent's expected compensating surplus was calculated by weighting the 
option prices he estimated for claims securing his most and least preferred 
vistas by their respective subjective probabilities of occurrence, splitting 
the residual probability equally between his option prices for clai~s secur~~a 
the tt-JO remaining vistas, and then summing arithmetically across the four 
v~stas. A Wilcoxon signed rank test for matched samples did not accept. at the 
1 1 
95 percent confidence level the null hypothesis of equali~y of ~p~i=n pr~ces 
for che elements in the six possible pairs of vistas for each sample in Tables 
la and lb. The encitlement which the willingness to pay measure 1.mpl1..eS does 
not allow a respondent value estimate to be less than zero in ?oreland, or 
less than the access fee he had already paid in the Cascades. 
Tables 2a and 2b present the statistics for che second, third, and 
fourth contingent claims markets; that is, the representative responient's 
value estimates tor guaranteed provision of his most preferred vis:a given a 
claim co a change in the posited time horizon, D~, the choice sec, X~, and 
the spatial extent, L~. When the data for ovi is used co estimace marginal 
rates of time preference for resolving visibility uncertainties, the Cascades 
sample produces arithmetic mean rates of 10.0 percent for a 2-year delayed 
resolution and 49.7 percent for a permanent resolution. 
sample the implied mean marginal rates are 17.8 percent for a 2-year de.:..ayed 
resolution and 45.1 percent for a 10-year resolution.~ These esc.J..ma=es _ie 
considerably above the 1.0 to 3.5 percent rates that the respondents 2n 
Brookshire et al. (1983) estimated for Wyoming game animal habitac. :-hey 
correspond rather well, however, to the 20-50 percent subjective dis=oun: 
rates that Hausman (1979), Houston (1983), and Hartman and Doane (1986) found 
for energy usi.J.g household durables and that Friedman ( 1962) and Fuc.:-:..s ( ~ 982) 
found for human health and capital. 
Far XYi, arithmetic mean respondent value estimates when there ;.;as :10 
access claim to a permanent (Cascades) or to a 10-year guaranteed resolution 
(Portland) of the most preferred vista were about 10 percent of che value 
estimates for the identical resolutions when che claim was available. 
Although 10 percent is not a negligible portion of total ex ante value~ ~= 1.5 
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far shor= of the greater than 50 percent estimate that Schulze et al. (1983) 
produced tor the existence value of visibility in the Grand Canyon. 
The fourth contingent claims market estimated marginal willingness to 
pay when the claim to the visual range in each respondent's most prefez-red 
v~sta was extended throughout the State of Oregon. Use of the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test to evaluate the null hypothesis of the equality of the .7/ean :otal 
payments for this extension, LV;, and the mean payments for the mosc preferred 
vistas, 0~, resulted in the hypothesis not being rejected at che 90 percent 
confidence level for the Portland sample. It could noc be rejected at che 60 
percent level for the Cascades sample. Thus, especially for the Portland 
sample, it is plausible that many respondents treated the local visual range 
as a surrogate for visual range throughout Oregon. Alternatively, they may 
have been indifferent to conditions elsewhere. These results provide r~:ixed 
support for Kahneman's (1986) conjecture that option payments act as surroga.:.,:: 
measures of general preference for environmental amenities. 
Explaining Respondent Willingness to Pay Estimates. The res=:.r icr:ed 
inverse Hicksian demand function in (3) has the access claim r:erms, che prlces 
of recreation activities, the utility level, predetermined visits, and :he 
probabilities of visibility scaces as its arguments. Access claim :erms are 
identical for each respondent in each sample. Price measures employed are :ne 
simple sum of respondent travel costs at 30 cents per mile and on-s~te =osts 
for the current visit, as well as respondent-estimated expenditures fo~ a 
single incident of the respondent-selected substitute activity. For t.':.e 
Cascades sample, travel costs were weighted by the respondent's interview s~:e 
visit days as a fraction of total trip days. The opportunity cost of r:ime is 
represented in the Cascades sample by a dummy variable indicating whether :he 
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individual was foregoing current income dur~ng his s~te v~sic.~ T.- the 
Portland sample the respondent's estimate of the costs of h~s v~s~: included 
lost wages. VarLables representing respondent education, leng~h of residency, 
annual visits, and frequency of outdoor activities mirror differences among 
respondents in tastes and in prior beliefs. Note again that neit.her our model 
formulation nor our respondents treat. annual visits and activity frequencies 
as choice variables. Expected visual range is the visibility leve1 that must. 
be exceeded if the respondent is to make a positive willingness to pay 
estimate. Other chan the depicted visual ranges, we treat all var~ables as 
linear. In accordance with Fechner's law, the depicted visual ranges are 
entered in their natural logarithms.~1 
Out of their 396 estimates of the willingness to pay for access claims, 
OPi, Cascades respondents made 181 estimates of zero, where each responden;: 
value estimate-visual range combination is treated as a distinct. 
observation.Lii The 268 Portland respondent willingness to pay estimates 
contained 123 zeroes. There was no upper bound to the willingness =~ pay :hac 
a respondent could esc2mate; he was not required to choose among discre:e 
willingness to pay categories; and the exogenous variables in ( 3) t-1e:-e 
observed irrespective of whether he had a zero or a positive willingness :o 
pay. These facts justify application of the Tobit transformation cc (3), 
given thac the error term is independently and identically discribu:ed ;.;i:h 
mean zero and constant variance [McDonald and Moffitt (1980)]. 
Jb display the resulting parameter estimates for each sample. 
Tables 3a a.'1d 
The ?oreland 
specification in Table Jb presumes that the factors influencing the 
respondent's willingness co pay for visibility improvements at any site in the 
14 
urban area are identical to chose influencing his willingness to pay at the 
interview Slte. 
With the exception of the statistically insignificant ''cost of visit'' 
variable in Table Ja, all price coefficients in both tables have the expected 
signs: as the cost of the respondent's visit and his foregone inccme 
increases, the value he acquires at the interview site declines; as :he pr~ce 
of a substitute increases, the value at the site increases. The pcsitive 
signs attached to the education coefficients are consistent with he~ghcened 
sensitivities co differences among claims to the uqualitiesu of natural 
environments, whatever the sources of these differences. The educated 
individual may be a more efficient producer of environmental services 
(Michael, 1973). The statistical performances of the other caste and prior 
belief variables differ drastically between the two samples. 
Cascades sample do they exert a fairly significant influence. 
Only ~n the 
Expected visual range, because it could be lower or higher than the 
particular range that the respondent was asked to value, could have = 
coefficient of either sign. The positive coefficients attached to _n (visual 
range) imply that willingness to pay increases at a decreasing rate as visual 
range increases. The percentage rates of decrease in each sample are sim~la~. 
Imolicit Discount Rates. If different groups of individuals use 
disparate implicit discount rates in evaluating the own-effects of a projecc, 
attempts by policymakers co override these cime preferences may cause 
unintended and possibly undesired resulcs. Scholastic searches for a u~ique 
market rate are irrelevant if intercemporal opportunicies co trade a~e 
seriously impaired and if these opportunities vary widely among groups. 
Therefore, even if the mechanism of the individual's discount rate choice ~s 
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not derived from first principles, the ad hoc association of the results of 
this choice with various individual attributes is of interest. 
Only years of education displayed a statistically significant (one-
percent level, one-tailed test) coefficient in ordinary-least-squares 
regressions to predict the discount rates that respondencs applied :::: a claim 
to permanent attainment (Cascades) and to 10-year attainment (Portla:;.d) of 
their most preferred vistas.D1 cascades respondents, on average, red:.:.ced the 
discount rates they applied by 7.2 percent with each additional year of 
education; Portland respondents reduced theirs by 6.6 percent. Variables 
representing Portland residency, annual outdoor recreation days, and age 
exerted no statistically significant influence upon the discount rates that 
Portland respondents applied. Similarly, Oregon residency, annual visits to 
the interview site, and age had no statistical influence upon Cascades 
respondents' implicit discount rate choices. 
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper provides estimates in an explicitly ex ante, stochast~c, and 
intertemporal setting of the site-specific values of claims to urban and to 
wilderness atmospheric visibility improvements. These estimates pi:ovide upper 
bound measures of value since respondents were unable to vary visit !i.'J.mbe::s in 
response to visibility changes. The main empirical findings are that: option 
price payments for claims guaranteeing access co improved visual ranges 
increase at a decreasing rate; the percentage =aces of decrease at a 
wilderness site and at an urban site are similar; marginal rates of time 
preference for resolving uncertainties about visual ranges vary between 10 and 
50 percent and are inversely related to education; existence value averages 10 
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percent of total value; and evidence is mixed of site-specific ~al~es actLng 
as surrogate measures far general environmental preferences. 
We close by discussing the broader implications of our ;,.;ark on :he 
nonmarket valuation of environmental phenomena. First, individual dec~sions 
are inherently ex ante, implying that planned expenditures rather :han 
realized ccsts explain individual choice. As shown by Helms (1985), the 
relevant measure of ex ante value refers to changes in the level c~ 
uncertainty for provision of a given level of a resource rather than a change 
in the resource level itself. By allowing respondents to ran~ order preferred 
resource levels, state their perceived likelihood of future provision of each 
level, and finally reveal their willingnesses to pay for an increase in 
likelihood of provision, our approach captures the correct definit~on of ex 
ance value. The empirical results reporced herein demonstrate :ha: r:.his 
definition of ex ante value can be measured in a straightforr,.;ard ma::.::.er. 
Second, our approach allows us to expand the dimensions of past C'lN 
exercises involving atmospheric visibility and other environmental goods to 
match heretofore disregarded dimensions of policy choices. By focusing 
respondenc attention on policy-relevant dimensions of choice, :-;e are able :o 
inform policymakers of the absolute and the relative weights indiv.iduals 
attach to these dimensions. 
Lastly, we acknowledge a .significant limitation that the employment of 
respondent degrees of belief rather than technical "objective'' probabilities 
imposes upon the usefulness of these results. Each respondenc's degrees of 
belief were employed :o calculate his expected v~sual range. Consequently, as 
the Tobit estimaces demonstrate, the value (compensating surpius) he atcached 
to a claim for a change in the probability of a visibility level ~as sensic~ve 
17 
to whether this level was greater than or less than his expec=ed level. The 
respondent was in essence asked to treat his expected level as a prior 
entitlement. These entitlements differed across respondents. The differing 
entitlements resulting from discrepancies across respondents' degrees of 
belief about identical objective visibility levels inhibited any effor: to 
develop equivalent surplus and compensation-demanded measures of va1ue. 
Valuations across respondents would then have been noncomparable because 
different value measures would have been applied to identical objective 
visibility levels. 
18 
TABLE 1a 
Cascades: Willingness to pay per Day of Current Visit 
Visual .~ange (kml 309 __ll_L _____§_L <' ~
Median payment $2.50 $2.00 $ 0 $ 0 
Arithmetic mean payment 4.04 3.00 0.89 ._,. • -r L 
Standard deviation 5. 4 9 4. 18 1 . 55 ~ . 2 7 
Expected visual range= 133.56 ~ 
Expected surplus = $1.96 
TABLE lb 
Portland: Willingness to pay During 1985 Summer 
Visual Range Ckm I 82 43 30 20 
l1edian payment s 60.00 $40.00 $ 0 s 0 
Arithmetic mean payment 93.36 57.00 16.95 ].38 
St.andard deviation 172.41 94.45 38.45 . ' ' _:) . ... ..., 
Expected visual range = 47.02 km 
Expected surplus = $44.10 
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TABLE 2a 
Cascades: Willingness to pay per Day of Current 1985 Visi~ 
for Contingencies Attached to Most Preferred Vista 
Ned ian 
Contingency Payment 
Delay resolution until Summer 1987 $2.00 
Permanent resolution 8.00 
No access claim, permanent resolution 0 
Resolution throughout Oregon 3.00 
TABLE 2b 
Arithmetic 
Mean Payment 
$ 3. 76 
11.48 
1 . 12 
6. 64 
Standard 
Deviation 
s 5.52 
3 7. 6 7 
2. 70 
14. 7 3 
Portland: Willingness to pay in Summer 1985 for Contingencies 
Attached to Mast Preferred Vista 
Median 
Contingency Payment 
Delay resolution until Summer 1987 $ 42.00 
Permanent resolution 200.00 
No access claim, permanent resolution 0 
Resolution throughout Oregon 70.00 
20 
Arithmetic 
Mean Payment 
$ 61.64 
262.48 
23.51 
117.57 
Standard 
.Jev ia t ion 
s 83.76 
372.71 
38.92 
217.32 
TABLE Ja 
Cascades: Tobie Estimates of Willingness co pay 
$ Per Day oi Current Visit 
Normalized Asymptotic 
Variable Coefficient t-Value 
constant ($) -7.508 -11.014 
Cosc of visit ($) . 760x1U3 .867 
Substitute expenditures ($) ' .119xlo-- 2. 612 
Foregone income (l=yes; O=no) - .253 2.437 
Education (years) . 1 61 6.433 
First visit (l=yes; O=no) - . 41 7 - 2.340 
Length of visit (days) - .535x10" 1 - 1 . 13 9 
Expected visual range (km) ' .498x10"- 2.997 
ln Visual range (km) .943 10.122 
Log~likelihood function -734.164 
Observations at limit 1 81 
Observations noc at limit 215 
Standard error of estimate 4. 82 7 
...., 
·" 
.271 
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TABLE Jb 
Foreland: Tobit Estimates of Willingness to pay 
S Per Year 
Variable 
Constant ($) 
Cost of visit ($) 
Substitute expenditures ($) 
Education (years) 
Annual outdoor recreation (days) 
Portland area residency (years) 
Expected visual range (km) 
ln Visual range ( km) 
Log-likelihood function 
Observations at limit 
Observations not at limit 
Standard error of estimate 
Normalized 
Coefficient 
-5.626 
. 100 
.4]8x1rJ3 
- .712x1rJ3 
- .164x1iT 1 
1 . 2 90 
-972.415 
123 
145 
136.520 
. 182 
22 
Asymptotic 
t-Value 
- 6.949 
- 2.723 
1 . 21 a 
3.318 
.502 
. 14 9 
- 1.755 
8. 796 
FOOTNOTES 
1..1 See Randall et al. (1974), Rowe et al. (1980), Schulze et al. (1983), and 
Hanley (1988), for example. 
£/ Anderson (1980) uses a distance function to show the inverse demand 
analogs to the well-known empirical restrictions (adding up etc.) on direct 
demand systems. 
11 This is a generalization of the Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) mean utility 
preserving spread. While working within a state-independent framewor.'<, they 
defined the spread as a change in the distribution of states chat maintains 
utility but shifts the probability mass toward the tails of the dist~ibution. 
A state dependent utility treatment allows utility to increase in some states 
and decrease in others if average utility taken across states is unchanged. 
~/ At first glance it may appear overly restrictive to assume visits are 
fixed, since efficient responses to changes in nonmarket goods include 
changing the number of visits. An effective CVM approach, however, ~ust 
control n-1 parameters, only allowing one parameter (environmental quality) to 
vary. In many previous CVM studies, one cannot determine if respondents were 
allowed to vary more than one parame!:.er, chereby creating a confounding 
problem. To avoid this, we explicitly control for substitution by not 
allowing it co occur. According to the Le Chatelier principle, relaxing this 
assumption would simply imply a decreased value for the good in quest~on. 
Therefore, one can view our restricted measure of value as an upper bound. 
~/ Mitchell and Carson (1988) favor discrete choice referendum mechods, 
e.g., Hanemann (1984), rather than direct willingness to pay methods in CVH. 
Discrete choice methods ask the respondent to rank alternatives from most co 
least preferred, given their associated prices. They argue that referendum 
methods accord much more closely to individuals' normal market experiences 
than do the direct inquiries into willingness to pay that we adopt here. They 
may be correct. However, Mitchell and Carson (1988) disregard numerous 
analytical and practical difficulties of the referendum method. They do not 
make it clear why having respondents express less information about 
preferences is desirable. Moreover, they tail to note that the discrete 
choice method when applied to risk problems requires independence of 
alternatives. Finally, empirical results obtained with referendum mechads far 
environmental goods have not been especially robust. Incorrect signs have 
appeared on price and income terms and the explanatory power of key paramecers 
has often been weak. 
§j For a review of the controversy on "starr:.ing point bias," see Boyle §.f. 
~· (1985), and Samples (1985). Those who express concern about this bias 
appear to attach no credence to abundant econcmLc, e.g. Markowitz (1952), and 
psychological, e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1982), arguments and evidence chat 
the individual's decision problem is solved conditional upon a reference point 
or set rather than with respect to final wealth. If the individual chooses 
the reference point in addition to the value estimate, values estimates become 
noncomparable across individuals when they choose different, ur.observable 
reference points. A finding of "starting point biasu fails to contradict the 
reference point view of decision-making. 
Z/ The final questionnaires resulted from a sequence of two precest 
questionnaires given to 15 respondents ac each site. Pretest and final 
questionnaire interviewers went though cwo one-hour training sessions 
conducted by an area survey consulting firm. Final questionnaires were 
administered by 4 employees of the Oregon Department of Environmental Qualicy. 
§_/ For the summer 1987 resolution the relevant formula ~s ~~ 5/ ( 2+rr, 
where W is the 1987 income equivalent, S is the 1985 income equivalent, and r 
is the discount rate the respondent used to estimate W. For the per:nanent or 
the 10-yearresolution the formula i=. W_= 5[(l+r/- l}jr(l+r/, where tis 
respectively infinity or 10. Since W, S, and t are known, these expressions 
are solved for r. As the time horizon increases over which discoun:::ng 
occurs, the estimated rate will converge upon a maximum. 
21 This disregards the Chavas ~ al. (1989) finding that the commodity value 
of travel time is positive but only a small fraction of the wage ra:e. 
l.Q/ Fechner's law [Baird and Noma (1978)] of psychophysics states chat the 
perceived strength of a just noticeable increment in a sensation (willingness 
to pay) is proportional to the logarithm of ~he stimulus (visual range). 
ll_/ Each respondent made 4 value statements for OPi. Thus the indi,_,.idual 's 
disturbance terms among his 4 statements could be correlated, implying a loss 
in estimation efficiency. 
Tables Ja and Jb make it 
If interest focuses on the visual range :;erm, 
clear that little statistical efficiency wculd 
gained by resorting to a seemingly unrelated regression technique. 
be 
11..1 The value statements of 6 percent of the Cascades respondents ar.d 10 
percent of the Portland respondents implied zero rates of discount. An 
ordinary-least-squares regression intended to explain t.he 2-year at:einment 
discount rates explained nothing. A majority of these rates were ze::-a in ea::-h 
sample. 
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TABLE A1 
Cascades: Sample Attributes 
Attribuce 
Sample Size 
Oregon residents 
Visit. Lengr;h (nights) 
First. visic 
Trip length (days) 
Trip expenditures 
Trip mileage 
Substitute trip expenditures 
Could have worked 
Education (years) 
Age (years) 
Expected visual range (km) 
Perceived chance of most 
preferred vista {percent) 
?erceived chance of least 
preferred vista (percent) 
Number ."!ean 
99 
87 
1 .56 
13 
4. 90 
$ 81.53 
390.08 
$101.39 
53 
15.40 
38.67 
133.56 
35.]0 
23.30 
Standard Je~~~tio~ 
10.56 
$130.~-d 
559.11 
Sl-42.09 
12.30 
33.39 
16.50 
12.30 
Attributes 
Sample size 
Portland area residency 
(years) 
Annual site vis1.ts 
Annual outdoor recreation 
(days) 
Cost of visit 
Cost of substitute 
Education (years) 
Age (years J 
Portland: 
Expected visual range (km) 
Perceived chance at most 
preferred vista (percent) 
Perceived chance of least 
preferred vista (percent) 
TABLE A2 
Sample Attributes 
Number t'1ean Standard Devia:ion 
67 
16.90 17.52 
9.24 
74.80 69 . .34 
s 31 . 9 9 $104.24 
s 15. 74 s 44. ~6 
15.01 2.51 
]9.99 15 . .: 9 
4 7. 02 
29.90 16 . .;0 
18.60 15.90 
